Good afternoon.

I am very pleasedto welcome Amartya Sen to Brown University.

He is here to speak in theWatson Distinguished Speaker Series in partnership withthe Brown-India Initiative.

I have to confess it'sa little intimidating to introduce Amartya Sen.

He's somebody I'veknown for a while, but constantly impressed with.

He is a toweringfigure in his field and a person with astonishingintellectual range.

As an economic theoristand a philosopher he received the Nobel Prizein Economic Sciences in 1999 in recognition of his workin social choice and welfare economics.

As a developmenteconomist he's conducted very important researchin the measurement of poverty and inequality.

And he's produced groundbreakingempirical analyses of the economics of famine,done great work in gender inequality.

Much of this work Itaught my own graduate students in developmenteconomics over many years.

And I can say that histhinking in this area truly revolutionized the waypeople think in the field.

As a public intellectual, inthe very best sense of the term, he's been a leadingvoice on public discourse around individual freedoms,liberty, and fairness.

And he's influenced the way wethink about policy responses to poverty, and humanwelfare, and inequality.

So when you put allthese things together, I think the beauty of allof these different facets of Amartya Sen's work ineconomic theory, philosophy, development economics, publicpolicy, the beauty of them is that they're reallyall of one piece.

In his autobiographicalsketch written at the time he receivedfurther Nobel Prize, he talks about his transitionfrom the more theoretical work in social choice tothe applied problems of inequality and povertyin the following way.

Quote, "My owninterest gradually shifted from the puretheory of social choice to more quote'practical' problems.

But I could not have takenthem on without having some confidence thatthe practical exercises to be undertaken were alsofoundationally secure.

" And the result of his insistenceon foundational security is that his insights onissues of immediate relevance to the world have an exceptionallevel of rigor and clarity of thought and death thatgives everything he does a lot of credibility andmake it have enormous impact.

I would also say thatthrough his own work he essentially gaveeconomists permission to think in a much moreexpansive way, but nevertheless rigorous way,about human welfare and how to analyze itand think about it.

Amartya Sen is currently theThomas W.

Lamont University professor and professor ofeconomics and philosophy at Harvard University.

He has held positions atLSE, Oxford, the Delhi School of Economics, and visitedany number of other places.

Although he's lived andworked all over the world, his ties to India haveremained very strong.

He recently published abook with his coauthor Jean Dreze titled AnUncertain Glory– India and its Contradictions.

This book highlightsand explores the paradox of very rapideconomic growth that coincides with high povertyand poor educational health outcomes, especially amongthe poor, all of the world's largest democracy.

His talk today is titled Whyis the Penalty of Inequality so High in India.

So please join me inwelcoming him to Brown.

Thank you.

[APPLAUSE] I'm very, very delighted andprivileged in being here.

And it's wonderfulto see the president.

I've known Christinafor a very long time and admired her work very much.

We worked togetherfor a while also.

And I was very privileged then.

I feel particularly sadthat I got delayed today.

It was partly Ileft a little late.

And then there wasa gigantic traffic, and ending with alsoencountering an accident in front of us, which– you liketo have accident behind you.

[LAUGHTER] That was unfortunate.

So my apologies.

And of course Ithank [INAUDIBLE] for arranging this occasionand seeing many friends here.

Well, I think oneof the problems about the Indian situationis this, that in many ways it looks peculiarthat India should be a country with as muchproblem as we actually do have.

It's a country whichhas been blessed with a successfulattempt at democracy.

In fact, it'simportant to recall that when Indiabecame a democracy at the end of the time whenthe British left in '47 there was a giganticset of meetings going on in the ConstituentAssembly, which arrived at a democratic constitution.

Extraordinarilyinteresting, lots of discussion about theshape of Indian democracy.

And with participation ofsome of the finest mind produced a democraticconstitution.

I was transiting from schoolto college at that time.

And I remember viewingwith some skepticism as to whether we wouldsucceed, but we did.

And yet somethingoddly has gone wrong, in the sense that if you lookat the situation in India today, in manyrespects it's really a kind of shocking situationwith literacy rate again still about a thirdof the females and a substantial proportionof the males still illiterate.

India having the highestratio of undernourished kids in the world.

The kind of debates aboutcriteria on the knife, but no matter which way youmeasure it, it's very high.

Immunization ratestill shockingly low, actually, if we look at thetriple immunization, which would be quite easy todeliver– it's still only 72% among the children.

And compared with China's 99%,Bangladesh is increasingly getting close to 90%.

The oddity is that allthis has been happening with fairly goodperformance in growth, which has declined very recently.

And every time thathappens there's tremendous panic for thosewho tend to judge everything in terms of justeconomic growth, and we havepredictively seen that.

But India's growth still[INAUDIBLE] basically, but sometimes it'smissed how the growth story began pretty early.

Because it's quitestandard to say that India used to have verylow economic growth– certainly still low economicgrowth in the sense that in the firstcouple of decades it was going at 3and 1/2% a year.

Now 3 and 1/2% ayear of course is a kind of utopian dream today.

That's not a standard to go by.

But you have to rememberthat the rate of growth of the Indian economy inthe first half century, that is before independence,was less than 1% per year.

And in fact the per capitaincome was growing at 0.

1% a year.

And compared withthat, 3 and 1/2% was quite a big jumpindeed, immediately.

But then it slowly went4%, 5% by about the '80s.

Then the '90s stillonly 5%, but it was laying the basisof much further growth rate in the– sorry– in thelate '90s and the last decade.

So beginning from '92 tonow, so it's now 20 years, there have been changes.

India's income capital isnow about three or four times what it was then.

And India's is morethan 5 and 1/2 times what it was when Indiabecame independent.

India was one of the poorestcountries in the world and is still one ofthe poorest countries, but it's not because therehasn't been any progress.

And in quite a lotof the last decade, India was the secondfastest growing economy in the world, large economyin the world, following China.

And at many stagesit looked as if it was closing in on China, Chinagrowing at 9%, 10%, and India growing 8%, 8 and 1/2%.

And a lot of people are reallyconcerned about catching up with China in termsof growth rate.

But of course, one ofthe peculiar things is that this is also aperiod when the Chinese went to universal literacy.

They went fairly early–that happened actually before the economic reforms.

Even in the Maoist periodthey were very concerned about literacy.

That was one of the actuallycommunist commitments that they had.

Also, universal healthcare– of very low quality, but neverthelessuniversal coverage.

And then China hada bit of a setback immediately after reform.

The Chinese used to be totallysuspicious of the market economy, which didn'tserve its economy well.

And its agriculture wasa chaos, real chaos.

Its industries were performingvery much below its ability.

So when in '79 the reform came,that anti-market suspicion was drowned, andthat was a victory for intelligent,open-minded planning.

But Chinese moved fromcomplete anti-market position to being completelypro-market position.

So they marketized everything,including health insurance.

In one jump they move froma position like Canada to a position like the UnitedStates with a much lower level of income.

And that, as you will recognize,was not an improvement.

The result, of course was thecoverage fell from 100% to 10% to 12% between '79 and '81.

And you see these in thisbook which Christina kindly mentioned, that we discusshow much the Chinese progress in longevity slowed down.

But then they recognizedthat things were going wrong.

I was privileged to be involvedwith the Peking University.

In fact, I still chair theinternational advisory board of the Development Instituteof Peking University.

And many peoplein the university were quite upset about it.

They wanted to go backto a universal coverage.

But the battle took some time.

But by around 2000it was quite clear that the critiquewas getting traction.

And 2004 the Chinesedecided to reverse it.

And of course, in characteristicChinese efficiency, they moved from there tonear universal coverage in the course of aboutsix or seven years.

Its at coverage ofabout 96%, 97% now.

Now actually while Indianswere talking about catching up on growth rate, therewas very little talk about catching upwith China in general.

I mean the Chinese had a lifeexpectancy which is 10 years longer than India's.

Literacy rate close to 100%,whereas India's lagging behind.

Medical coverage nearly 100%.

Now all that was happeningwhile India was growing.

And I was surprisedin some ways that it was continuing togrow for so long, because there wereproblems even then.

And of course theseproblems have really come out more strongly now.

When people ask me was Isurprised that Indian growth rate slowed down.

And I said, no, I've notbeen, because I was fearing this might happen and it did.

Well, let's postponethat story there.

I want to come backto it as to what might have been going wrong there.

But let's just forget Chinanow, just think about India.

So here the economy growingfast, leaving the colonialism behind.

The British empire began witha gigantic famine of 1770, it ends with a gigantic famineof 1943, which as a child I actually witnessed becauseit was all around me in Bengal.

And there was nofamine since then.

There were manyother achievements, but something went deeply wrong.

And those who look forinequality in Gini coefficient and so on would say, look,what are you grumbling about? The inequality level is not sohigh in India, and indeed so.

There is a littlestatistical folly in that, because Indians hadexpenditure inequality, whereas all countries likeChina, Israel, Russia, and others compared withthat had income inequality.

Anyone who's involved withthis kind of economics knows that inequalityin expenditure tend to be less than in income.

And there are all kindsof reasons for that.

If you're interested,we can discuss it.

But then when youcorrect it, now we have actually income inequalityfigures, reasonable one.

And it's higher than we thought.

But on the otherhand, it's not higher than in China, it'sabout the same.

The Chinese inequality hasgrown over these years of huge progress– so has India's.

The Chinese have grown alittle bit more than India.

But then, what's the problem? I mean India was growingalmost as fast as China.

It's inequality level was nothigher than that of China, it wasn't increasingfaster than China.

So what went wrong? Now is there anexample we needed to think about how tothink about development, this was a major issue.

I think there aretwo central themes in the Indiandevelopment story today.

One is the importanceof development.

And the second is the connectionbetween development and growth.

I'll come to the secondlater, but now the first.

I think the ideathat you can judge all this in the spaceof income overlooks an enormous number of things.

Of course, at avery basic level, it leaves out the vulnerabilityof people, whether natural or socially created–epidemiological.

But related to that, of course,is the role of the state.

It's not often recognized howmuch of the increase in life expectancy in Europe took placewith really a very active state action, from epidemiology,to health care, to nutrition, even theschool meal program that India is doing, forthe country to invent it.

And of course they wereenormously successful in that.

So there was a kind offocus on public services which somehow missed out.

Now in India, since thecountry is full of grumble that too much money isspent on social services, you hear again and again thatIndia was a socialist economy.

And a lot of people havenever forgiven the fact that Indian has moved it way.

But that's is very peculiar.

I think the socialisteconomies like Russia and China have all kinds ofeconomic problems.

But one problem and theydidn't have is illiteracy.

In fact, a great Indianpoet, Rabindranath Tagore went into Russia in 1931.

And he published a book calledRussiar Chithi in Bengali.

In English it was Lettersfrom Russia, which of course the English– the British–immediately banned.

And oddly enough, the ban wasn'tlifted until independence.

But there he wassaying, we raised– it was quite an interestingthing to read, actually, talking about the Soviet Union.

He on one side saidthat it's so dramatic to see educational expenseeven way down in Soviet Asia.

And today, even if youlook at the numbers in that part ofthe world, you can see which had been part of thatcommitment– which is exactly the same commitment thatthe Chinese also had.

But of course they alsohad many other things.

And Tagore alsogave an interview to Izvestia wherehe was saying, look, you're doing lotsof good things, but you seem to notallow people to speak.

This is shortly after thetrial and the purges– shortly before thetrials and purges.

But he was alwayssaying that you have to examine thatif you're really doing so many good thingswhat are you afraid of? Why do you have somuch censorship? And so on.

Of course Izvestiadidn't publish it.

To be exact, theydid publish it, but not in 1931, but in 1967.

But of course The Guardianpublished it in '31, immediately.

And so there was these twosides which he was noticing.

And of course hewasn't an economist, he wasn't commenting on howcounterproductive collective agriculture was.

And that of course, therewas an immediate parallel to that in China.

So India was allegedlya socialist economy without some of thethings that made at least a superficialappeal to socialism in the form of the SovietUnion, China possible, namely a shared fate about education,a shared fate about health care, and so on, none of whichabsolutely happened.

So in some ways thatterminology is quite important.

I've been spending a littletime with the debates in the Constituent Assembly.

And one of my students,Anand Giridharadas, who actually writesin the New York Times, he give me a copy of the 14volume Constituent Assembly papers.

And when it came,I thought of it that it would be a showpiece.

But I got so engrossedin looking through it.

And they discuss theissue of terminology.

And one of theinteresting things, a great politicalthinker, then a socialist, later the founder of thefree market party Swatantra, called Minoo Masani.

And he's speaking there ofthe socialists very often.

Every time he speaks, he beginsby saying, as the socialist, I must say, et cetera.

Quite interesting.

But there's a remark.

He said, you have to bevery careful about the word.

And he says, forexample, fraternity.

It's always hadsuch a great origin in the French Revolution, butseeing how the French treated their concept of fraternityshortly following the revolution, when I haveto introduce my brother, says Minoo Masani, Icall him my cousin.

[LAUGHTER] And I think something of thatkind happened with socialism as well.

So it never wentin that direction.

In fact, the firstfive year plan, which is oftencriticized for lots of things like heavyindustries and focus on technical education, butof course the first five year plan also did theIITs and so on, which really becomea big success.

And something shouldbe acknowledged here– it did it with giganticAmerican corporation, namely, MIT was very involved in it.

In fact without them– I thinklater the role of Silicon Valley is recognized– but theearly technical education, that came they much from MIT.

So there was a globalcooperation at that level.

But it also discussesbasic education.

And it decided thatbasic education is not of much use to the people.

What is useful isvocational education.

A subject, which, incidentally,Karl Marx had spoken rather eloquently about how one's classwhere duties is so strong that you can't even think of theworkers having any [? leave ?] to do with education,theatre, music, literature.

But vocationaleducation, they have to find out how to delivernewspapers door to door.

Now so first five-year plan didnothing for basic education.

They did something thatthey called basic education.

And here, let'ssay we were misled by one of our great leaders,namely Mahatma Gandhi, because he also said thatformal education, the three Rs, were no use to people.

What you need is thatthese formal education should come through their work.

And they recommended, amongother things, the charkha.

And there was a certain debatebetween– this was taking place in the '30s– betweenTagore, whom I referred to, and Gandhi on that.

And Tagore wrote back, sayingthis seems quite a mistake.

Because you have tolearn reading, writing, and arithmetic, and so on.

And then he said that aboutcharkha, I've tried that, and it seemed to consistof endlessly rotating the wheel of anantiquated machine with a minimum of imaginationand a maximum of boredom.

And he didn't see how thatcould be educating anybody.

Now there was a debate.

So what happened is– Idon't know what Gandhi would have done had he been alive.

He was dead by then, of course.

I think he probablywouldn't have gone long with the proposalnot to have primary education focus.

But that was a thing.

And that was reallyeven the architects– Mahalanobis andNehru– all agreed to.

So school education wasneglected again and again.

My earliest intervention on thissubsequent was at that time, in the '50s and the '60s.

Afterwards, when I wasfortunate to get the Nobel, the one with the Calcutta paperstatement published a lot of it that I tried to do.

And as one of the personsthen said, that look, I see that in the late'50s and early '60s you were sayingmuch the same thing.

Why is it that youideas have not evolved? So I said to say, well, plainlybecause the problem remained exactly the same.

[LAUGHTER] And I'll stop talking aboutthat– oh yes, he said, when will you stop talkingabout the same things? I said I will when theproblems cease to exist.

So the neglect of thebasic public services was a gigantic issue.

And that continued.

The economic policy changed,India's economic growth rate picked up.

They also had tremendouslycounterproductive government policy.

The state wasn't doing what itcould do and should do well, was doing everything thatit could not do well, namely controlling everything.

And controlling everythingwith a remorselessness which is now hard to imagine.

I remember in '63 when Iwent back to India– how we doing for time, Christine? Oh, you're good.

OK.

When I went back to Delhi, andI'd just come from Cambridge, I still had someconnection, so I wanted to keep my bank account.

So I was told you can'tkeep your bank account, you have to get thereserve bank's permission.

So I inquired, I wentto the reserve bank, and they say, oh well, ofcourse, you fill up your form, your name will be called withincoming two or three months, and then you can comeand discuss that.

So then I was veryfrustrated, and I mentioned it to [INAUDIBLE] friend whowas in the government, as you can tell, in fact [INAUDIBLE].

And he said, oh, no, no, Ihave to send you to someone.

So I arrived.

And since I came witha good introduction, I was invited into meet this chap.

I sat opposite him in the table.

And he was talkingaway with people asking for various permissions.

And I could hear only oneend of the conversation.

And one of them wentlike this, say, oh yes, so you want to go to Canadabecause your sister is in Canada and you needsome foreign exchange to go to Canada.

When did you seeyour sister last? To which, the answer, he said,oh, you saw her last year.

You know, government ofIndia is very keen on sisters seeing sisters, but oncein two or three years– [LAUGHTER] –should be quite adequate.

Now I think that level ofintervention of course– I mean I see myselfpartly as a libertarian also, despite myleft-wing beliefs, because I don't thinkthere's any conflict there.

I thought the violationof liberty was terrifying.

But then of course it wasn'tvery good for industry either– you can't runa business like that.

And of course, thatdid change in the '90s, too– not adequately.

I think we stillneed more reform.

There's still many moregovernmental run around that you have to whichyou should avoid.

And any study of comparisonof how quickly you can get a decision between,say, China and India, will bring up the drama ofhow quickly it can happen.

It's not so much the corruption.

Corruption level inChina is, I don't think, any less than in India.

So I think corruption is aterrible thing and must go.

But that's not wherethe problem really is about the recent slow downwe have been experiencing.

So there was that, sosomewhat continuing that.

So dramatically reducedunder the leadership of Manmohan Singh.

Led actually recently alsoby the prime minister, who was already asked and wantingto become financial minister at that time.

So that team did somethingand the growth rate did go up and so on.

But the neglect of basicpublic services didn't change.

And this is actuallyquite a dramatic contrast with what happened nearlyevery country in the world.

China, Brazil, even Indonesia,as they became richer they expanded theseservices enormously in a way that India never did.

Now India spends 1.

2% of theGDP on governmental health care.

China spends 2.

7% ofa much larger GDP.

Brazil spends even higher.

India is one of thelowest in the world.

So I think one of the reasonswhy the penalty of inequality is so high is theinequality aiming is all about income inequality.

And that's not a verygood way of looking at it.

And you talk aboutparticipatory inclusive growth, but then you have to askwhat makes good inclusive.

And here the focus of income hasbeen a kind of blinding impact.

Now there have beendebates, and people get upset about whether thereshould be employment guarantee scheme.

Some people point outrightly that there's a lot of waste in that.

Others point out,also rightly, that even looking at thelabor statistics that wages havecertainly responded.

You see, one of theoddities contrast between India and China isthat the Indian rural wage has been almost stationary,where the Chinese rural rage has been going at 7% a year.

And it's remained competitorsdespite these rise in wages, which indicates howmuch productivity was going.

But why was theproductivity going? Well, they weregetting increasingly a more and moreeducated labor force, and healthier and healthierlabor force, which, as Adam Smith notedin 1776, is ultimately the major basis of development,the quality of labor.

Now oddly, that is of coursewhere development and growth activity relate.

Because education and health isextremely important to leading a good human life as well.

There's no contrast here.

The idea we do growth first andthen we do developmental later is really a very odd wayof thinking about it, because one of thebiggest ways of expanding your productive potential is tohave an educated, healthy labor force, unionized labor force,people who are not constantly taking leave in order to becausethey have some illnesses.

And also have contrastsin dealing with illnesses.

For example, even if youcontrast with, let's say, Bangladesh, only about 39%of the Indian population when faced with diarrhea,which is quite a common kind ofgastrointestinal problem, only 39% knows the– use therural rehydration technology, whereas Bangladesh isbetween 80% and 90%.

So I think there's a kind ofa mismatch of the commitment with the work.

Now really where thecommitment has been there, India has performedrelatively very good, like the famineelimination with itself.

I mean famines wereassociated with colonialism.

When the world opened itselfup, and all my uncles, if you call them that–well, a brother of my mother and cousins, and myfather's cousins, they were all in prisonsof various kinds.

They were what used to becalled preventive detention.

Not that they had done anything,but they could do something.

So in order to prevent them,you kept them in prison.

So I went and visitedthem every now and then, and I wondered whythey were in prison, as I was moving from six,seven, eight, nine, 10.

But famine was a commitmentthat was totally there.

And of course as soon asIndia became independent, it went there.

What about a commitment, anothercase which often sometimes India doesn't getenough credit, is people may remember aboutsix, seven years ago everyone was sayingthat India was going to be the greatcenter of the AIDS epidemic.

It's going to be numberof people with AIDS and HIV think thatwould be larger than the rest of theworld put together.

Well, what happened to that? Well, basically itcaught the imagination, the newspapers took it up, andthe media is very important, to which I'm coming presently.

So depends on whatissues you engage in.

If you don't diagnose theproblem, it won't be solved.

And the positive side is ifyou do diagnose a problem, very likely it will besolved, and certainly resolved to a great extent.

And there are many otherexamples of that kind.

Immunization, the standard ones,you don't get any attention.

But of course poliobecame [INAUDIBLE], Pakistan continued thatand India didn't, became a showcase, and of coursepolio could be eliminated.

It's not been declaredcompletely gone, because you have to wait threeyears without a polio case before it's seen as gone.

I think it's now abouttwo years on that.

So whenever there'sattention, something happens.

But attention is very central.

So one of the reasons whythe inequality, penalty of inequality, isso high in India, is because the publicdiscourse has not seen how terrible thelevel of inequality is– education, healthcare, immunization.

Even such small things–55% of the Indians live in homes without a toilet.

Now I know that opendefecation is not a subject that academic universitieslike discussing, but it is a big problem froma disease point of view.

Even today you canbuild a house in Delhi and get a permission tobuild a condominium which, so long as it satisfiesaesthetic requirement, will get a permission withoutthe need for any servants' toilets, even though all ofthe families have servants.

Toilets.

Oddly enough, the onlyplace and the only city in India– actually,they're different.

Calcutta is a lotbetter than Delhi.

But the best city fromthat point of view is Chandigarh, mainly becauseof [INAUDIBLE], because that was part of the planning.

It indicates how urban designcan make a real difference on this kind of issue.

But for that, youhave to recognize that there is a real problem.

Were we the firstto talk about 55%, that India having a higherratio of open defecation than any othernation in the world, and somebody raised thequestion and found that Chad had a slightly higher.

But that's the only competition.

Were Jean Drezeand I first to say? No.

It came about 10 years ago innational [INAUDIBLE] survey.

What happened? There was a certain amountof shocking statement in page 27 in the newspapers,and then [? it went.

?] So I think in order toinequality be solved, we have to recognize inequalityto be a really important issue.

And it's not justin the inequality.

And it's not just thequestion of public services being concerned withemployment or food subsidy.

But it's concerned with thebasic delivery of those things where a successfulgovernment should do.

There has been novariation on that.

Adam Smith talkedabout it in 1776.

But we haven't caughtup with that yet.

And that is a gigantic failure.

And it's very difficultto get media attention, because you're immediatelydeflected onto that.

And I'm not goingto comment on– some people here mightknow that there have been debates going on.

I don't know why it's calleda debate, because they have said nothing on the subject.

But even if you receive it back,it is a debate of some kind.

But the interestingissue is that instead of what is– actuallythe New York Times review did say that– that toillustrate the point that we're making, that the media doesn'tlike to give it attention, the whole discussion of thebook about the [INAUDIBLE] unflattering portraitof India got completely downed on theirstories about feud between one economistand another, which was a terrible wayto deal with what we are trying to present to the media.

So I think the mediaattention is very important.

It's extremely important alsoto see the role of women as well as men in this context.

And that is the Indianconsciousness on the women's issue has increased,and particularly after the incident of rapein December 16 last year.

There have beena lots of things.

I have an article– I justwas reading it in the car because it's in theNew York Review.

And you can't miss itbecause it's on the cover.

And it's called Mixed Truth.

Now I think outside says,truth about the women of India, but inside the title isIndian Women– Mixed Truth.

And it is a verymixed truth, indeed.

I denied myself a slideshow,so I can't show you the slide.

And I didn't know how to getit on my way to Providence.

But if you go by sexselective abortion– you know, India's missing women,like China's, used to be large because womenwere relatively neglected after they're born.

When I first wrote about itin 1990 in the same journal– Missing Women– In> New YorkReview that was the reason.

But that has come downeverywhere– not gone, but come down.

Both in China and in India womenhave a higher life expectancy than men do.

And yet, before being bornnatality discrimination, the technique have grown.

People can now determinefetuses and they go.

But if you take theaverage picture, you get completely– doyou think I could– there is the New York Review there.

I think– Here.

I don't know whetherpeople can see that.

I don't know ifyou can see that.

[LAUGHTER] Actuallly, allthis here in India have female-maleratio [INAUDIBLE].

And all these [INAUDIBLE].

And in India, the gap– wetook 935 [INAUDIBLE] ratio.

[INAUDIBLE] So from 935, girls being– I don't know whether peopleknow the biology of it, that everywhere moreboys are born than girls.

In fact, all boys areconceived, and male fetuses, are conceived than female.

It took me some time whenI started work on it.

Roughly about a thousandboys are conceived compared with– well, Ishouldn't call them boys– male fetusesare conceived compare with 910 female fetuses.

By the time they're born,since women do in the uterus and outside the uterusbetter than men, given symmetric care–and in the uterus they do get symmetric care.

Then you tend tohave by the time they're born, in Europe youget about between 935 to 945.

The average was 942 for Europe.

So if you take that[INAUDIBLE] and take the lower one of that, namelythe [INAUDIBLE] that if you deliverthat it must be.

So I didn't useonly 935, I actually took lower of the two, even920, and tried to check.

Now all these states in thenorth and the west of India have way below 920,including Haryana 842, Punjab 854, Gujurat 891.

And compared with Kerala,Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Assam, West Bengal, Tamil Nadu,Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, even Bihar and[INAUDIBLE] generally.

So what's to come? I don't know what there's to do.

But how is the effect? Well, I think theway women are treated makes a big differencein economic development.

Because one of the questionsthat we have to ask– on one side there's China.

The Chinese differenceis very easy to explain, because the Chinese have beenputting, in a classic way, putting much moreinto public services than India in everyfield, without exception.

Those who always argue thatwe have to learn something from China don't seem to lookat the most important lesson from China, as to how itenhances people's lives and how educated, unionizedhealthy labor force is terrific for your economicdevelopment and growth.

But if you lookat Bangladesh, it hasn't been spendingmuch more on that.

What they did do,partly connected with the nature of thepolitical movement that led to the separation of EastPakistan from West Pakistan, producing Bangladesh–and of course there was a bit ofBengali nationalism, they went back to 16th century[INAUDIBLE], et cetera.

That's a story about a woman,poor woman's life, et cetera.

And they becamea big commitment.

And so Bangladesh went for basiceducation, elementary education for girls.

It has a higher ratio ofgirls than boys in school.

In fact, Bangladeshhas a higher ratio of girls to boys than anyother country in the world.

It became a major commitment.

Bangladesh's involvementof women in labor force, in school teaching,in public services, health care, in familyplanning, in all of them is massive more than in India.

And you begin to seethe impact of it now.

I mean even on thesubjects of the toilets I was mentioningthis became an issue.

It's by the way, especiallyan issue for women, because the idea ofopen defecation– I'm sorry to discuss thissubject, Christine– but to go, if it means that youhave to go off the dock, it's much more dangerousfor women than for men.

The whole issue– soBangladesh, not surprisingly, toiletless households in Indiais 55%, in Bangladesh it's 8%.

In all the criteria– wealthy,health care, education, and so on, Bangladesh hasbecome much ahead.

And life expectancy,Bangladesh used to be three years behind India.

In 1990, after that Bangladeshhas been growing moderately, whereas India growsferociously fast.

And instead of being only50% richer than Bangladesh in per capita income then,it became 100% richer by now.

And yet, it fell behind.

Life expectancy was three yearsbehind– three years ahead, India was.

Now it's three years behind,three to four years behind.

Infant mortality rate.

In every one ofthese indicators.

And here the whole issueabout gender justice, like in the case of development,which relates to growth, gender justice alsois something which is not only importantfor women but also important for the entireperformance of the economy, for developmentalprofile in general.

So I would say that thesetwo factors– and media has to pay more attentionto that rather than be concerned with glitzy thingslike films and others.

I don't object to have afilm actress or [INAUDIBLE] so that's theatre.

So it's nice to see herpicture every now and then.

But I think thewhole idea that these are the more importantissues to deal in India is really a gigantic folly.

Similarly, women'sissues hardly ever– now it got a huge issue on therape, but it didn't cover well.

For example, I been inthe New York Times day before yesterdaysaying, well, there's many more things happeningin India, in Delhi, but other cities, mygod, is a problem.

But other cities is farless problem then in Delhi.

The rate of rapeis nine times as high in Delhi as in Calcutta.

And I think they'rebig differences, but these are not media stories.

I mean one reasonwhy I may be claiming some credit for gettingin New York Review without others noticingis because these are standard statisticsbut they're not discussed statistics.

And this contrastthat I'm drawing on sex-selective abortionalso indicates an attitude to women which isalso a contrast.

And we have to learnwhat it is due to.

I don't know what the answer is.

I mean there are clear languageconnections between– and I won't stipulate– betweenTamil-based languages and of the Sanskrit languages,the two bifurcations, mainly Magadhi– which is theeastern part– and Shauraseni.

And it's the Magadhi partthat is on the Tamil side, as opposed to Shauraseni.

Why? I don't know what could be theconnection between language and– I do want to work on that.

But you have to recognizethat [INAUDIBLE].

So I would say media, generalattention to deprivation, the issue of women'sequity, these are the ways of makinginequality important.

And ultimately it's alsoto make growth stable.

Growth is not requiredfor its own sake, but it's really important.

And I'm often accusedof not having said it, which I must say I find abit peculiar since my PhD thesis was on economicgrowth and my second book was called Growth Economics.

But on top of that, in 1989when Jean Dreze and I wrote our first– this is our seventhbook together– first book together, we discussedwhat we called the growth-mediated security,when you need growth, but not just for its own sake.

So it's that focuswhich I think would make a difference to thepain of inequality in India.

Thank you.

[APPLAUSE].